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HOW THE EU DEFENDS ITS NON-TRADE OBJECTIVES 
BEFORE THE WTO: AN ANALYSIS OF SPS/TBT 
DISPUTES
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Summary: The European Union is at the same time one of the staunch-
est defenders of a liberal and multilateral trading order and often the 
most radical regulator in protecting the health of citizens and the Eu-
ropean and global environment. This might be problematic when ‘pro-
tective’ regulations at home are perceived as ‘protectionist’ measures 
abroad. This article looks at a particular arena where the EU has to 
confront this potential contradiction: the World Trade Organization’s 
dispute settlement system. How does the EU reconcile its free trade 
ambitions with its regulatory stringency there? It is found that the EU 
manages to act consistently before the WTO courts by refraining from 
pressing charges against other countries’ sanitary and phytosanitary 
and technical measures and, as a third party, speaking out for the 
defendant by advocating discretion in deciding on and maintaining 
the appropriate level of protection. That the EU is so much on the ‘pro-
tection’ side of the continuum before the WTO courts is explained by 
its own early losses in some high-profile, sensitive WTO disputes in 
combination with the more risk-averse stance of the European public.
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) is, at the same time, a staunch believer 
and supporter of free trade and multilateralism and the most radical 
protector of the health of its citizens and the European and global envi-
ronment. Inevitably, these two positions sometimes clash. An extensive 
literature has addressed the question of how the EU tries to solve this 
conflict. According to many observers, the EU tries to ‘export’ or ‘upload’ 
its ambitious regulations so that it attains its regulatory objectives and 
at the same time assures the free flow of goods and the competitiveness 
of its businesses.1 According to others, this argument is overstated. They 
argue that the instances where EU regulations are significantly affect-
*  PhD, Assistant Professor, Centre for EU Studies, Department of Political Science, Ghent 
University.
1 See D Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy 
(Harvard University Press 1995); RD Kelemen, ‘Globalizing European Union Environmental 
Policy’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 622; C Damro ‘Market Power Europe’ 
(2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 682.
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ing third countries’ regulatory politics, leading either to trade conflicts 
or the uploading of EU norms, are rather rare, and that the EU is only 
incidentally a ‘Fortress’ or ‘market power’.2 Still others argue that the EU 
accommodates much more its own regulatory politics to global economic 
integration and trade rules than is often assumed.3 
This article looks at this debate, which has only become more topical 
with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotia-
tions where ‘regulatory convergence’ is the main objective, from a specific 
perspective. It starts from the similar question of how the EU assures 
consistency between its (offensive) trade positions and its (protective) reg-
ulatory objectives. To specify the dilemma further: the EU is, on the one 
hand, one of the most prominent advocates of tackling behind-the-border 
trade barriers through multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations and 
adjudication. But, on the other hand, much of the EU’s ambitious regu-
latory policies are seen by its trading partners as exactly of this type of 
non-tariff trade barrier that the EU otherwise wants to eliminate. This 
article asks how the EU tries to ensure that it acts consistently4 before 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) judicial bodies, and focuses on dis-
putes about sanitary and phytosanitary and technical measures. It will 
be shown that, after some years of experiencing how the new regulatory 
rules of the WTO presented the hardened EU regulatory policies with 
problems, the EU increasingly tended, first, to consistently refrain from 
bringing complaints against third countries’ environmental, health and 
safety regulations before the WTO, and, second, as a third party, to con-
sistently side with the defendant. In this way, it avoids accusations of 
2 See AR Young, ‘The Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and World Trade’ 
(2004), 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 393; P Müller, Z Kudrna and G Falkner ‘EU-
global Interactions: Policy Export, Import, Promotion and Protection’ (2014) 21 Journal of 
European Public Policy 1102.
3 See MP Smith ‘Single Market, Global Competition: Regulating the European Market in a 
Global Economy’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 936. 
4 The assumption that consistency is an objective of the European Union is underpinned 
by it being mentioned in the Treaties as a general principle of the EU. Cf. art 13(1) TEU and 
art 7 TFEU. At the same time, it is recognised that the EU does not always succeed in pur-
suing consistency, including between its trade and regulatory policies. Because different 
institutional actors have different interests, responsibilities and powers in different policy 
fields, this may result in sometimes inconsistent positions and policies. For example, until 
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament was not formally competent in trade policy 
matters, and could therefore be expected, and indeed observed, to be less sensitive to the 
external trade effects and WTO compatibility of EU regulatory policies. On the other hand, 
the European Commission as the sole representative of the EU in international trade ne-
gotiations and dispute settlement is very sensitive to the external effects and WTO compat-
ibility of internal EU regulation. See F De Ville, ‘Explaining the Genesis of a Trade Dispute’ 
(2012) 34 Journal of European Integration 37; F De Ville, ‘European Union Regulatory Poli-
tics in the Shadow of the WTO’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 700; T Perišin, 
‘EU Regulatory Policy and the WTO’ in M Cremona and T Takács (eds), Trade Liberalisation 
and Standardisation: new Directions in the ‘Low Politics’ of EU Foreign Policy (Asser Institute 
2013).
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only defending ‘the right to regulate’ when it is in its own interests to do 
so, and may simultaneously be trying to influence the interpretation of 
the WTO courts of the regulatory agreements to effectively ensure more 
autonomy for itself in adopting protective regulations.   
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section two, 
I consider the WTO’s rules and dynamics as a supervisor of its member 
states’ regulatory politics. I give nuance to the idea that the multilateral 
trading system is so highly legalised that the only two options for states 
are to comply with its strict and detailed rules or to undergo retaliatory 
sanctions. Instead, I argue that the WTO’s rules are liable to (unsettled) 
interpretation, and that these interpretations are influenced through ju-
risprudence that is itself affected by how states plead in disputes. This 
makes WTO disputes not only an interesting area to study how the EU 
wants to avoid being found guilty of inconsistency, but also concern-
ing how it might try to broaden its own space for consistent regulatory 
and trade policies. This constitutes the analytical framework for section 
three, where I discuss, necessarily in an abstract way, the EU’s conduct 
in all Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) disputes of which it has been part. In section four, I go on to explain 
the EU’s strategy in SPS/TBT disputes. I end with some conclusions and 
suggestions for further research. 
2. The ‘political’ nature of WTO regulatory supervision
This section sets the scene for the remainder of the article. It argues 
that WTO dispute settlement represents a strategically selective institu-
tion that affects member states’ strategic behaviour vis-à-vis the organi-
sation’s agreements and its judicial bodies’ rulings, but is itself also af-
fected by the disputants’ strategic behaviour. 
The WTO is often considered the world’s most legalised multilateral 
institution. The reasons are that, first, since the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round, it has a dispute settlement system whereby disputes are 
adjudicated by lawyers instead of diplomats, including next to an ad hoc 
tribunal (called a ‘panel’ in WTO-speak) a standing Appellate Body (AB). 
Second, states are, under the WTO Treaty, obliged to comply with WTO 
Agreements, litigation proceeds automatically and sanctions can be au-
thorised, unless all WTO members reject them. Thus, the WTO scores 
high on two of the three dimensions that determine the degree of legalisa-
tion according to Abbott and others.5 However, WTO agreements are less 
strong as regards precision, the third dimension of the definition. 
5 KW Abbott and others, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organiza-
tion 401. 
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This imprecision implies that the WTO judicial bodies have great 
leeway and responsibility in filling gaps and clarifying vague provisions. 
Moreover, while WTO member states are in principle legally obliged to 
comply with their commitments and WTO rules, and the AB can author-
ise retaliatory sanctions if they fail to bring condemned measures into 
conformity, in most WTO member states WTO rules and dispute deci-
sions have no direct effect, and states can ultimately decide to accept 
retaliation instead of complying.6 This, of course, raises the possibility of 
defection, something an international court will want to avoid. According 
to an extensive literature, international courts have a strong preference 
to ‘have [their] authority accepted and expanded’, as Schepel and Wes-
seling have formulated with regard to the European Court of Justice.7 
For these reasons, many analysts working in the nexus of inter-
national relations and international law have recognised that the WTO 
judicial bodies are to a considerable extent constrained by politics.8 They 
thus have to act strategically, and adapt their strategic action dynami-
cally. The WTO judicial bodies have to take into account two, sometimes 
contradictory, pressures. First, there is the legitimacy of their decisions, 
defined here as the acceptance of their decisions by elected officials.9 
On the other hand, there is the legal consistency of their rulings, which 
means being in accord with both the WTO agreements as well as with 
their own earlier decisions. Thus, the precedential value of decisions has 
great importance. The WTO judicial bodies have to take into account 
their own jurisprudence as well as how the membership will react to their 
decisions.  
The story does not end there. Not only do the WTO judicial bodies 
act strategically, anticipating how states will react to their decisions, but 
WTO member states act ‘in the shadow of the WTO’. This means that 
they will take into account relevant (and, as explained, often ambigu-
ous) WTO rules, as well as the jurisprudence (if available) of the WTO 
judicial bodies, when enacting regulations. They will generally want to 
avoid losing a dispute, because this generates reputation costs as well 
6 See JH Bello ‘Less is More’(1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 416; JH 
Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Misunderstandings on the Nature 
of Legal Obligation’ (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 60. 
7 H Schepel and R Wesseling ‘The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks 
in the Writing of Europe’(1997) 3 European Law Journal 165. 
8 RH Steinberg, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional and Political 
Constraints’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 247. According to Steinberg, 
‘the Appellate Body is constrained by international legal discourse and politics, as well as 
constitutional structure’. These three factors are nested: legal discourse is constrained by 
constitutional rules, which is constrained by politics. 
9 DR Kelemen ‘The Limits of Judicial Power: Trade-environment Disputes in the GATT/
WTO and the EU’ (2001) 34 Comparative Political Studies 622.
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as possible economic costs through retaliatory trade sanctions. But they 
will thereby also anticipate how, given the political circumstances and 
the state of the legitimacy of the world trading system, third states will 
react and how they think the WTO judicial bodies will decide. Indeed, also 
complainant nations will make such strategic considerations, and will 
often refrain from bringing cases where the violator is likely not to comply 
with a negative decision by the Appellate Body.10 Again, there are several 
reasons for this. First, when a complainant wins a dispute, the fact that 
it is authorised to adopt retaliatory measures is less than a reward. This 
resolution mechanism of the WTO punishes in the first place consumers 
in the country winning the dispute. Second, states that have an interest 
in the world trading system will not want to erode its legitimacy by pro-
voking non-compliance through forcing the WTO judicial bodies to adopt 
a decision that is very unpopular (and unfeasible) in the contravening 
state. And, third, states will be reluctant to bring before the WTO cases 
that lead to decisions that might backfire by restricting their own policy 
space in the future.11
Thus, how the EU acts as a complainant, a defendant or as a third 
party12 may influence the interpretation of the extent to which and the 
conditions whereby domestic regulations are compatible with WTO rules. 
In this way, the EU has an influence on the autonomy the WTO leaves to 
its member states’ regulatory policies and can thus help expand its own 
regulatory autonomy. 
The SPS and TBT Agreements (hereinafter: SPS and TBT) are consid-
ered the two regulatory agreements of the WTO that specify the general 
obligations of the GATT as well as, especially, the exceptions to these 
obligations as foreseen in Article XX GATT. The SPS is the agreement 
on how governments can apply food safety and animal or plant health 
measures, while the TBT tries to ensure that regulations, standards, test-
ing and certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
trade. The SPS is considered to be more constraining than the TBT (which 
are both considered to be more restrictive than the GATT13). Both make 
10 G Garrett and JM Smith ‘The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2002) Occasional 
Paper Series, UCLA <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4t4952d7> accessed 15 November 
2014. 
11 AR Young ‘Of Executive Preferences and Societal Constraints: The Domestic Politics of 
the Transatlantic GMO Dispute’ (2011) 18 Review of International Political Economy 506. 
12 Third parties are all but trivial in WTO disputes. See ML Busch and E Reinhardt, ‘Three’s 
a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2006) 58 World Politics 446. The con-
ventional wisdom is that third parties signal the preferences of the wider membership of the 
organisation, thus influencing the strategic behaviour of WTO tribunals. 
13 G Marceau and JP Trachtman, ‘The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ 
(2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 811.
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it a positive obligation to choose the least trade-restrictive measure to 
attain an appropriate level of protection, but only the SPS explicitly regu-
lates risk assessment and requires scientific bases for regulation. Also, 
in the area of SPS measures, quasi-legislative authority has been given to 
certain international functional organisations, as members should base 
their SPS measures on international standards developed by them, while 
this is not the case for TBT measures. Similarly, the requirement of the 
SPS to accept foreign regulations as equivalent if the exporting country 
can prove that its measure achieves the importing country’s set level of 
protection is stronger than the more hortatory obligation of the TBT to 
give positive consideration to mutual recognition. 
Before discussing the EU’s involvement in SPS/TBT disputes, I brief-
ly introduce how the WTO settles disputes. When a WTO member state 
thinks another member has taken action that breaches WTO obligations 
or commitments, it can lodge a complaint. Subsequently, at the first 
stage the parties are encouraged to find an amicable solution through 
consultation and mediation. Only if this fails is a panel set up, issu-
ing a report in half a year’s time. This report is adopted unless the full 
membership rejects it or unless one of the parties appeals against the 
report on legal grounds. In the case of appeal, the Appellate Body issues 
a report on these legal objections. Normally, given the strict deadlines for 
the different stages, a dispute should not take longer than one year and 
three months. However, at every stage of the procedure, consultation and 
mediation are still possible. As a consequence, only about one third of the 
cases pass through the full panel process, while the others are settled out 
of court or remain in a prolonged consultation phase. 
3. The EU’s involvement in SPS and TBT disputes 
This section discusses the EU’s positioning in SPS/TBT disputes be-
fore the WTO. It will show that the EU stopped attacking third countries’ 
sanitary and phytosanitary and technical regulations in 2003 and has 
also since the beginning of the 2000s consistently sided with the defend-
ant as a third party. As will be discussed, this cannot be explained by a 
lack of EU interest in third countries’ trade-distorting regulations, as the 
EU has kept addressing these through other venues within and outside 
the WTO, most notably within the WTO’s non-judicial SPS Committee.   
Let me set the scene with some overall figures. The EU has been 
a complainant in seven SPS/TBT cases.14 In total, 13 cases have been 
lodged against the EU citing the SPS and/or TBT Agreement. The EU has 
14 SPS/TBT cases submitted by different countries that have the same object are treated as 
single cases. All WTO dispute information and documents can be found at <http://wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm#results> accessed 15 November 2014. 
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been a third party in 16 SPS/TBT cases. In sum, 53 cases citing the SPS 
and/or TBT Agreement had been brought before the WTO judicial bodies 
until 2014. In two thirds (36) of these cases, the EU was involved as a 
respondent, complainant or third party. The EU thus plays a significant 
role in WTO adjudication on regulatory issues, making it highly interest-
ing and relevant to analyse how it tries to have the rules interpreted. 
Figure 1. SPS/TBT disputes and EU involvement
Source: WTO website
What strikes the eye immediately when looking at the evolution of 
EU involvement in SPS/TBT disputes in this graph is that the EU has not 
brought a single case citing the TBT and SPS Agreements from 2003 until 
2014,15 while it brought seven SPS/TBT cases before the WTO between 
the establishment of the Organization in 1995 and 2003. The idleness of 
15 The data collection and analysis for this article was concluded at the beginning of 2014, 
thus covering the period 1995–2013. However, after concluding the research, one new SPS/
TBT dispute was launched (in April 2014) at the WTO when the EU requested consultations 
with Russia concerning certain measures adopted affecting the importation of live pigs, 
pork and other pig products from the European Union (DS 475). While this dispute could be 
seen as contradicting the central argument of this paper - without going into the details of 
the case (which falls outside the scope of the period under analysis) - it seems to be rather 
exceptional geopolitically and geo-economically in the light of both escalating trade as well 
as political frictions between the EU and Russia since the latter’s accession to the WTO in 
2012 (the ban had been imposed by Russia in late January 2014, at the height of the politi-
cal crisis in Ukraine, and consultations between the EU and Russia on the issue failed in 
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the EU in lodging SPS and TBT complaints cannot be explained by the 
relapse of technical and (phyto)sanitary cases in general since the early 
2000s. While there was indeed moderation after the first years which 
witnessed a high number of cases (38 between 1995 and 2003), and a 
trough in the years 2004–2006, after this period 15 new disputes were 
lodged. The EU has also not refrained from acting as a third party in 
SPS and TBT disputes after 2006, and has remained a target for SPS 
and TBT complaints. Neither has the EU stopped lodging complaints 
against other WTO members citing WTO agreements other than the SPS 
or TBT. Nevertheless, there has been a regression: from 63 initiated 
WTO disputes by the EU between 1995 and 2003 to 26 since 2004. This 
corresponds to a certain extent to a reversion in the number of WTO dis-
putes in general: 305 between 1995 and 2003 and 164 from 2004 until 
2014. This general relapse might be for different reasons. A first one is 
that the high number of cases in the first years was because countries 
used the new dispute settlement procedure to clear up some old busi-
ness. A second reason is that, because of increased judicial restraint 
exercised by the WTO judicial bodies over the years, countries found it 
less effective or interesting to bring WTO cases.16 When we look at the 
United States, we see that it has lodged 14 SPS/TBT complaints so far. 
While indeed these are also rather concentrated in the first years of the 
WTO’s existence (12 until 2004), the US lodged two new complaints in 
2009 and 2012. 
Whereas alternative explanations for the reticence of the EU in ini-
tiating SPS/TBT disputes after 2003 that would apply to the full mem-
bership (having cleared up long-running disputes in the first years and 
increased judicial restraint by the Appellate Body making complaints 
less interesting) might offer part of the answer to the puzzle of this ar-
ticle, the fact that a number of new SPS/TBT cases have been lodged 
recently, including by the US, hints at a more EU-specific situation. An-
other explanation that has to be refuted is that the EU since 2003 has 
not had any real problems with regulation in third countries and thus 
has no interest in SPS/TBT complaints, possibly because regulation 
within the EU has become in many cases more stringent than abroad. 
This does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation either. Since 2011, 
the EU has published yearly a trade and investment barriers report. In 
2011, ‘Regulatory issues – Technical regulations and standards (Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary issues)’ were 
mentioned as among the ‘most important problems European compa-
nies face when they want to get access to the markets of [...] strategic 
16 I thank Alasdair Young for bringing these points to my attention.
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partners’.17 In 2012, some progress was mentioned with India, but it 
was noted with regard to that country, as well as with Russia, that many 
outstanding problems remain. Also in its 2013 report, the Commission 
stated that it ‘remains worried about the general approach of India of 
keeping unjustified and unnecessary SPS measures as a way to maintain 
its agri-food market closed to imports’ while with regard to Russia even 
new barriers were found. Other evidence that the EU did not become 
less concerned about foreign SPS/TBT regulations can be found in the 
SPS Committee’s18 list of specific trade concerns that WTO members had 
raised between 1995 and 2012. The EU raised 69 issues during this pe-
riod, of which 38 before 2004 and 31 since 2004.19 Thus, while the EU re-
frained after 2003 from lodging disputes with the WTO’s judicial system, 
it kept on complaining about third countries’ regulations within the SPS 
(consultative) Committee.  
The remainder of this article argues that the EU’s reluctance to file 
complaints against SPS and TBT measures can be explained by its solid 
position that states should not be too judicially constrained by multilat-
eral rules and rulings in protecting the health and safety of their citizens, 
as well as the environment. This position is the result of some notorious 
food safety scandals within the EU coinciding with the EU losing a high-
profile WTO case (the Hormones dispute), at a time when an even more 
controversial dispute (on genetically modified organisms) was looming. 
Let us first look at the outcomes and EU behaviour in the SPS/TBT 
disputes in which the EU has been involved.
17 European Commission, Trade and Investment barriers Report (2011, 2012, 2013) avail-
able at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=878> accessed 15 Novem-
ber 2014. 
18 The WTO’s SPS Committee provides a forum for consultations about food safety and 
animal or plant health measures that affect trade. 
19 WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Specific Trade Concerns’ 
(2013) Note by the Secretariat, G/SPS/GEN/204, Rev 13.
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In the SPS/TBT disputes lodged against the EU, violations have 
been found in six cases, but in one case (Asbestos) this has been per-
mitted under the public health exception of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT Article XX(b)). In Hormones, retaliation has been 
sanctioned by the Appellate Body. In Biotech products, authorisation to 
retaliate has been requested but the proceedings have been suspended. 
In the two other cases that the EU lost, it has implemented the decision 
or agreed a solution with the complainant. In two other cases, a mutual 
solution was found before a ruling, and four cases are in the consulta-
tions stage (of which three have been there for a long time). For one case, 
a panel has been established but not yet composed. In the Seal Products 
case, the panel determined that the exceptions of the EU Seal Regime (for 
indigenous communities and maritime resource management), but not 
per se the Regime as such, violate TBT Article 2.1 (non-discrimination). 
Both Canada and the EU decided to appeal to the AB. The Appellate 
Body20 has largely upheld the Panel’s finding, raising concerns about the 
way in which the exception from the ban for indigenous hunting has been 
implemented, but in general affirming that the measure is necessary to 
protect public morals.
I lack the space in this article to discuss the EU’s arguments in all 
these disputes,21 so I will concentrate on the main lines of defence in 
the most controversial cases. In the Hormones cases, the EU argued be-
fore the panel that ‘WTO dispute settlement panels were not competent 
to judge its level of sanitary protection nor the scientific evidence upon 
which it was based, but only whether its measures were in conform-
ity with the provisions of the SPS Agreement’.22 It also claimed that its 
measures were based on the precautionary principle and that the US 
had failed to discharge its burden of proof because it failed to show that 
the measures at issue were more trade-restrictive than necessary. The 
EU claimed also that as the measures did not violate the SPS, they were 
also in conformity with the GATT. Eventually, the EU lost the dispute 
as the panel concluded that its measures were not based on a risk as-
sessment (Article 5.1 SPS), resulted in arbitrary or unjustifiable distinc-
tions in the levels of sanitary protection (Article 5.5), and were not based 
on international standards (Article 3.1) without justification (Article 3.3). 
The EU appealed the ruling, claiming inter alia that: the panel erred in 
its allocation of the burden of proof under the SPS agreement in finding 
that it rests on the member imposing a measure; it erred by not according 
deference to the appropriate level of protection, the scientific assessment 
20 See WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014).
21 For example, the panel report in Biotech Products alone fills more than one thousand 
pages.
22 WTO, ‘EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Complaint by the 
United States: Report of the Panel’ (1997) WT/DS26/R/USA. 
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and management and adherence to the precautionary principle of the 
EC measures; panels should adopt a deferential reasonableness when 
reviewing a member’s assessment of scientific evidence; and the panel 
erred in considering that the precautionary principle was only relevant 
for provisional measures (WTO 1998: 4-15). The AB sided with the EU on 
the issue of the burden of proof, but upheld the panel’s conclusions that 
the precautionary principle would not override other obligations and that 
the EU’s measures were inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 5.1 SPS. 
In the Biotech dispute, the EU generally argued that ‘the approach 
... has been fully consistent with evolving and applicable international 
standards, and any finding to the contrary would seriously undermine 
the effectiveness of these standards, which are premised on the applica-
tion of a prudent and precautionary approach’ and that it believes ‘that 
its actions have been and are those of a prudent government’.23  The pan-
el found that the EU applied a de facto moratorium and had consequently 
acted inconsistently with Article 8 SPS because this caused undue delays 
in the completion of approval procedures. With regard to product-specific 
measures, inconsistency with Article 8 SPS was also found, while with 
regard to EU Member State safeguard measures, inconsistency with Ar-
ticles 5.1 (risk assessment) and 2.2 (scientific evidence) was recorded. 
Table 2. EU as complainant
SPS/TBT Year of initiation Outcome
DS 77 Argentina - Measures af-
fecting textiles, clothing and foot-
wear
TBT 1997 Withdrawn 
DS 85 US - Measures affecting 
textiles and apparel products TBT 1997
Mutually agreed 
solution 
DS 96 India - Quantitative restric-
tions on imports of agricultural, 
textile and industrial products
SPS 1997 Mutually agreed solution
DS 100 US - Measures affecting 
imports of poultry products SPS/TBT 1997 In consultations
DS 151 US - Measures affecting 
textiles and apparel products (II) TBT 1998
Mutually agreed 
solution
DS 279 India - Import restrictions 
maintained under the export and 
import policy 2002-2007
SPS/TBT 2002 In consultations 
DS 287 Australia - Quarantine 
regime for imports SPS 2003
Mutually agreed so-
lution 
23 WTO, ‘European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Bio-
tech Products: Reports of the Panel’ (2006) WT/DS291/R.
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In the cases where the EU cited SPS or TBT articles as a complainant, 
none has reached the stage of a formal ruling.24 The EU has withdrawn 
one case, found a mutually agreed solution in four instances, while two 
disputes have remained for a long time at the stage of consultations. It 
should also be mentioned that only DS 100 and DS 287 can actually be 
considered as ‘genuine’ regulatory disputes, the others revolving around 
rules of origin, duties or quantitative restrictions. DS 100 concerns one 
of the many battles in the Transatlantic ‘chicken war’ that dates back to 
the 1960s. In the mid-1990s, the EU and the US tried to find Veterinary 
Equivalence Agreements. When this attempt failed for poultry, the US 
retaliated against stringent EU poultry standards (basically prohibiting 
the US practice of decontamination with a chlorinated solution) with a 
ban on poultry imports from the EU. The EU responded by initiating a 
case at the WTO, but never pushed it through the stage of a ruling, and 
the parties remain formally ‘in consultations’ while chicken will be one of 
the controversial issues within the TTIP. In DS 287, the EU and Australia 
reached a mutually agreed solution in 2007. This included enhanced 
transparency of Australia’s quarantine regime, principles of treatment 
for market access applications for the EU, and continued expert discus-
sions, while respecting Australia’s appropriate level of protection, legisla-
tion and import policy development process.
Table 3. EU as third party




DS 2 US - Standards for 
reformulated and con-
ventional gasoline
TBT 1995 Venezuela Complainant
DS 18/21 Australia - 
Measures affecting the 
importation of salmon
SPS 1995 Canada & US Defendant
DS 56 Argentina - Meas-
ures affecting the im-
ports of footwear, tex-
tiles apparel and other 
items
TBT 1996 US Complainant
DS 76 Japan - Meas-
ures affecting agricul-
tural products
SPS 1997 US Complainant
DS 237 Turkey - Certain 
import procedures for 
fresh fruit
SPS 2001 Ecuador (Mutually agreed solution)
24 It seems that the EU has initiated some cases where it cited SPS/TBT articles as leverage 
to reach a mutually agreed solution. This succeeded in the majority of cases. 
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DS 245 Japan - Meas-
ures affecting the impor-
tation of apples
SPS 2002 US Defendant
DS 270 Australia - Cer-
tain Measures affecting 




but not yet 
composed
DS 367 Australia - 
Measures affecting the 
importation of apples 
from New Zealand
SPS 2007 New Zealand Defendant
DS 381 US - Measures 
concerning the importa-
tion, marketing and sale 
of tuna and tuna prod-
ucts
TBT 2008 Mexico Defendant
DS 384/386 US - Cer-
tain country of origin 
labelling (Cool) require-
ments
SPS/TBT 2008 Canada & Mexico Defendant
DS 391 Korea - Meas-
ures affecting the im-
portation of bovine meat 
and meat products
SPS 2009 Canada Defendant
DS 392 US - Certain 
measures affecting im-
ports of poultry from 
China
SPS 2009 China Defendant
DS 406 US - Measures 
affecting the production 
and sale of clove ciga-
rettes
SPS/TBT 2010 Indonesia Defendant
DS 430 India - Measures 
concerning the importa-
tion of certain agricul-





but not yet 
composed)
DS 434/435 Australia 
- Certain measures con-
cerning trademarks and 
other plain packaging 
requirements applicable 
to tobacco products and 
packaging
TBT 2012 Ukraine & Honduras
(Panel 
established 
but not yet 
composed)
DS 447 US - Measures 
affecting the importation 
of animals, meat and 
other animal products 
from Argentina
SPS 2012 Argentina (Panel composed, no report yet)
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How does the EU position itself as a third party in SPS/TBT dis-
putes? When a dispute leads to a formal ruling, we know how the EU 
has argued regarding the case, because the panel (and, if appealed, the 
AB) report extensively summarises third party submissions. The EU has 
been a third party in 11 SPS/TBT disputes that have led to a formal rul-
ing. Only in three early cases (DS2, 54 and 76) has the EU sided with the 
complainant, while in the other cases it sided predominantly with the de-
fendant.25 In DS 2, the EU argued that the measure under consideration 
was not proportionate and did not meet the necessity test of Article XX 
GATT 1994. DS 56 did not really concern a TBT dispute but was rather 
on specific duties imposed by Argentina exceeding its bound rate for the 
products concerned. In DS 76, what should surprise us more than the 
fact that the EU sided with the complainant, the US, is that the EU did 
not opt to act itself as a complainant, given that the EU also has impor-
tant commercial interests in exporting agricultural products to Japan. 
And also in this case, the EU sided with the defendant on important legal 
issues, such as that the burden of proof should be with the complainant. 
In the other cases, the EU consistently defended the right of the defend-
ant to choose an appropriate level of protection and the right to take a 
precautionary or preventive approach.26 The EU mainly intervenes, on 
the side of the defendant, to preserve the discretion of states to regulate, 
which may be illustrated with an excerpt from its submission in DS 367: 
Indeed, an over-extensive interpretation of the role of WTO ju-
dicial bodies in SPS disputes would risk to impinge upon the 
role of national authorities when determining their ALOP. On 
this point, the European Communities largely agrees with the 
legal considerations developed by Australia on the issue of the 
standard of review. Therefore, the European Communities urges 
the Panel to be conscious of the scope and limits of the role 
attributed to it under the Understanding on rules and proce-
dures governing the settlement of disputes (the DSU) and the 
SPS Agreement.27
Another interesting example is DS 392 (US – poultry from China), 
which is of course an especially interesting case as it relates to the long-
standing quarrels between the EU and the US on chicken, making it 
even more surprising that the EU made statements supporting the US 
25 Also in DS 384, the EU ruled that the conclusion could be that the measure was incon-
sistent (with art 2.2 TBT), but on a very limited basis, while it sided with the defendant (the 
US) on most other issues.  
26 Again, it is impossible to discuss the EU position in detail in every dispute; instead, I 
summarise the EU position and give two notable examples. 
27 WTO, ‘Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand: Re-
port of the Panel’ (2010) WT/DS367/R. 
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position.28 In the case, one of the key issues was if a US ‘pause’ in the 
establishment and implementation of measures that would allow Chi-
nese poultry to be imported into the US constituted an undue delay (and 
hence a violation of Article 8 SPS as with EU – Biotech) or a provision-
al, precautionary measure allowed under Article 5.7 SPS, which the EU 
used, unsuccessfully, as an affirmative defence in Hormones and Bio-
tech. While the EU noted an absence of information and interpretation 
from both sides, it noted that the possibility of a defence of the measures 
under Article 8, Annex C.1(a) or Article 5.7 could not be ruled out. 
To sum up, the EU has not been a complainant in any SPS/TBT 
dispute that reached the stage of a formal ruling and stopped lodging 
complaints against sanitary, phytosanitary or technical regulations or 
standards after 2003 until 2014. The EU has been an active third party 
in SPS/TBT disputes, where it has mostly sided with the defendant, ex-
cept for three early disputes. We can thus conclude that the EU has 
been very reluctant to use the SPS and TBT Agreements to contest third 
country regulations for consumer protection, health and environmental 
protection purposes. This inclination has only been strengthened since 
the final years of the 1990s. Since 2002 the EU has mainly sided with the 
defendant as a third party in SPS/TBT disputes. 
In the next section I analyse the rationale behind this reluctance of 
the EU to file complaints against SPS/TBT measures and its siding with 
the defendant as a third party and why the period 2002/2003 is a turn-
ing point. 
4. Explaining the EU’s approach to SPS/TBT disputes  
Why has the EU stopped attacking SPS/TBT measures of third 
countries before the WTO judicial bodies, and why has it sided with par-
ties defending such measures, notwithstanding continuous frustration 
by EU exporters and trade officials with a significant number of such 
non-tariff barriers (see section 3)? This section argues that by not judi-
cially complaining against SPS/TBT measures, the EU wanted to avoid 
being accused of ‘hypocrisy’ (or double standards) when it argues as a 
defendant for the Union’s own discretion to decide on its appropriate 
level of protection (ALOP) and the way to attain it. This defensive position 
has been strengthened after losing two controversial disputes before the 
WTO: Hormones and GMOs. 
In early 1998, thus around the circulation of the AB report in the 
Hormones dispute, and as an ‘opening salvo in the simmering dispute 
28 WTO, ‘United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China: Report 
of the Panel’ (2010) WT/DS392/R.
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over GMOs’,29 the then EU agricultural commissioner Franz Fischler 
stated that the EU would like to renegotiate the SPS to permit trade re-
strictions for reasons of ‘consumer preference’. The special agricultural 
negotiator for the US Trade Representative Peter Scher replied that for 
the US ‘[t]here are few higher priorities than fighting this very disturbing 
proposal’.30 The EU had unsuccessfully tried to insert ‘genuine consumer 
concerns’31 as a legitimate criterion on which to base SPS measures in 
the agreement during the Uruguay Round, against the opposition of the 
US that ultimately prevailed.32 The EU did not press the issue because 
‘many of the food safety scandals that ... hardened EU preferences ... took 
place after the SPS agreements’ and therefore ‘the SPS agreement was a 
low-priority issue for the EU during the Uruguay Round’.33 
As the EU agreed without much reflection to a rather strict SPS with 
which it would rapidly come into conflict after certain food scandals made 
EU consumers risk-averse and keen for more protective regulations, it 
had to seek a new strategy to defend its hardened position before the ju-
dicial bodies of a multilateral institution it was very supportive of. Since 
then it has tried to stretch the interpretation of the WTO agreements, the 
SPS agreement in particular, so that they leave more autonomy for states 
to decide on their ALOP, how this ALOP has to be (scientifically) justified 
(including the meaning of ‘rational relationship’ between risk assessment 
and the measure in question34), and who shoulders the burden of proof in 
a dispute.35 The EU is mainly trying to persuade the AB to view the pre-
cautionary principle as a general principle of international law in the light 
of which all provisions of the SPS should be interpreted, rather than be-
ing just one of the articles (Article 5.7 SPS), and a strictly circumscribed 
one, that does not override other specific obligations contained in other 
articles of the SPS.
That the EU shifted so much to the ‘protective’ side of the continu-
um before the WTO after 2003 can be understood as follows. It had lost 
29 JD Gaisford and others, The Economics of biotechnology (Edward Elgar 2001). 
30 WA Kerr, ‘International Trade in Transgenic Food Products: A New Focus for Agricultural 
Trade Disputes’ (1999) 22 The World Economy 245. 
31 And also animal welfare and environmental concerns.
32 G Skogstad ‘The WTO and Food Safety Regulatory Policy Innovation in the European 
Union’ (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 485.
33 D Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton 
University Press 2007). 
34 As elaborated in DS 26 (EC - Hormones) Appellate Body Report. 
35 During the negotiations of the SPS agreement, the US and the EU disagreed on whether 
the importing country that imposes an SPS measure or the exporting country had the onus 
of proving its (un)safety. The EU believed that the burden of proof should remain with the 
marketing country, while the US thought the opposite. According to Skogstad (n 32), the US 
largely prevailed in the negotiations. In the meantime, the WTO judicial bodies have shifted 
the burden of proof to a large extent to the complainant party. 
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the sensitive Hormones dispute amidst food scares,36 leading to a loss of 
confidence in EU risk regulation (and even in EU institutions in general). 
The Commission adopted a communication embracing the precaution-
ary principle and a white paper on food safety in 2000, and in 2003 the 
European Food Safety Authority was created. Finally, in 2003, the US 
(with Canada and Argentina) eventually initiated a dispute against the 
EU’s GMO regime that had wide public support. The EU’s reaction to this 
was, as shown in this article, not only to stop initiating SPS/TBT disputes 
itself, but to support a broad interpretation of the precautionary excep-
tion within the WTO by supporting it not only as a defendant but also as 
a third party. 
The SPS Agreement recognises, in its Article 5.7, the precaution-
ary principle in all but name, although only under insufficient scientific 
evidence, on a provisional basis and on the condition of the pursuit of 
fuller scientific assessment, leaving room for (restrictive) interpretation. 
The AB in its ruling in EC – Hormones indeed stated (para 124) that ‘the 
precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear textual 
directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the nor-
mal (ie customary international law) principles of treaty interpretation in 
reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement’, as later also recalled by the 
panel in EC – GMOs. Thus, if another article of the SPSA is violated (eg 
scientific risk assessment), Article 5.7 or the precautionary principle in 
general cannot save a member state. 
As previously said, the European Commission issued its Commu-
nication on the precautionary principle in 2000. But the precautionary 
principle did not help the EU a couple of years later to defend its GMO 
regime. The EU, as explained above, lost the GMO dispute. While decid-
ing against the EU on rather narrow grounds, the panel also confirmed 
the AB’s systemic interpretation in EU – Hormones that the precaution-
ary principle does not relieve member states of complying with the other 
obligations (risk assessment, scientific justification) of the SPS. 
It seems that, while carrying on the fight to have a broad interpre-
tation of the precautionary principle within the WTO, the EU is trying 
another justification of stringent regulation that it did not get accepted 
during the Uruguay Round: collective preferences.   
At the end of his term as Trade Commissioner, and rather on a per-
sonal note, Pascal Lamy proposed to introduce a special safeguard clause 
for ‘collective preferences’.37 This safeguard clause would have to be ac-
36 For an impressive list of food scares between 1998 and 2006, see T Knowles, R Moody 
and MG McEachern ‘European Food Scares and their Impact on EU Food Policy’ (2007) 109 
British Food Journal 43.
37 P Lamy, ‘The Emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade: Implications 
for Regulation Globalisation’ (speech at the Conference on Collective Preferences and Global 
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companied by two conditions: it would be necessary to demonstrate that 
there is a coherent underlying social demand and that the adopted meas-
ure is consistent with that demand; and it would be necessary to demon-
strate that the measure does not restrict trade more than other measures 
that satisfy the same demand. The EU’s ban on trade in seal products 
tries to get this principle recognised in the international trading system.
In 2009, the EU banned the import and marketing of seal products, 
with a derogation for traditional hunting by Inuits.38 The EU has been 
taken to the WTO dispute settlement body by Canada and Norway and 
has defended its decision on ‘public moral’ grounds (Article XX(a)). The 
WTO dispute settlement organs were thus required to consider non-in-
strumental rationales as a distinct basis for trade restrictive measures.39 
Indeed, the EU, in its submission, defines the policy objective of 
the measure as follows: ‘the EU legislators sought to address the moral 
concerns of the EU public with regard to the presence on the EU market 
of seal products’ (para 33). The EU, in point 2.5 ‘Evidence of the public 
moral concerns’ of its first written submission then argues that the large 
majority in the European Parliament and in the Council, the fact that 
some Member States had already introduced national bans, and a mul-
ti-country survey confirm the sincerity of the public moral concerns,40 
analogous to the first condition that Lamy had specified in his special 
safeguard clause proposal. Also, in section 4.4.2, ‘The measure is neces-
sary to protect public morals’, the EU argues that it is up to complaining 
parties to identify reasonable available alternatives and that the alterna-
tive measures that Canada and Norway have identified are not apt to 
make an equivalent contribution to the policy objective sought by the 
regulation, as demanded by the second condition of the Lamy proposal. 
In an earlier case (US – Gambling), a panel favoured a dynamic ap-
proach to the meaning of ‘public morals’: ‘in the panel’s view, the content 
of these concepts for members can vary in time and space, depending 
upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and 
religious values’ (para 6.46141). The same dynamic approach (or ‘evolu-
Governance: What Future for the Multilateral Trading System, Brussels, 15 September 
2004). 
38 De Ville, ‘Explaining the Genesis of a Trade Dispute’ (n 4) 37; T Perišin, ‘Is the EU Seal 
Products Regulation a Sealed Deal? EU and WTO Challenges’ (2013) 62 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 373. 
39 R Howse and J Langille ‘Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the 
WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values’ (2012) 
37 Yale Journal of International Law 367. 
40 For a profound critique of the use by the EU of the ‘public moral concerns’ justification 
of the ban, see Perišin  (n 38). 
41 Cf. Howse and Langille (n 39) 413.
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tionary interpretation’) has also been noted42 with how the WTO judicial 
bodies interpret the discretion of states to take trade restrictive measures 
‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ (Article 
XX(g) GATT). Indeed, while after the Tuna Dolphin cases the view was 
that the GATT/WTO did not allow unilateral (‘extra-territorial’) measures 
designed to pressurise other Member States to change their process and 
production methods, this was explicitly allowed to promote conservation 
in the Shrimp/Turtle cases. 
Thus, the EU’s attempts to stretch the interpretation of the WTO reg-
ulatory agreements may not be without merits. It might not be excluded 
that a relatively broad interpretation of the precautionary principle and/
or of the right of states to restrict trade for genuine collective preferences 
will gain recognition by the WTO because of the EU’s consistent exercise 
of this discretion and the defence of this before the WTO courts, both as a 
defendant and third party. The ruling in the Seals dispute will be instruc-
tive in this respect. 
5. Conclusion
This article has addressed the question of how the EU solves the 
possible contradiction of, on the one hand, being one of the strongest 
supporters of the multilateral trading system while, on the other, be-
ing the most radical regulator in the area of environmental and health 
protection, leading often to interferences with free trade. The EU was 
confronted with this tension immediately after the establishment of the 
WTO when it lost the contentious Hormones dispute amidst food scares 
in Europe. As had been expected for years, in 2003 its controversial but 
within Europe widely supported GMO regime was brought before the 
WTO courts. This article has shown that the EU reacted to these events 
by ceasing to initiate disputes against third countries’ food, environmen-
tal and safety regulations, while consistently siding with defendants as 
a third party in SPS/TBT disputes. The EU thereby mainly promotes the 
discretion of states in choosing their appropriate level of protection and 
in adopting a precautionary approach. More recently, it seems that the 
EU has also taken up again an old but unsuccessful attempt to introduce 
‘collective preferences’ as a legitimate exception within the WTO. 
This article’s main objective was to portray and explain the EU’s 
behaviour in SPS/TBT disputes in the WTO. It has focused less on the 
question of how successful the EU’s strategy is. However, in the law lit-
erature on WTO dispute settlement, we find evidence that the Appellate 
Body has, in line with the EU’s advocacy during the disputes discussed 
42 See I Cheyne ‘Gateways to the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law’ (2007) 19 Journal of 
Environmental Law 155. 
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here, over the years moved towards a balanced, more deferential ap-
proach as regards the standard of review that requires panels to apply 
a procedural review focused on the method through which a measure is 
decided, rather than on the outcome of the decision.43 Further research 
could examine to what extent and how the EU’s behaviour in WTO SPS/
TBT disputes has been influential in this subtle evolution of WTO juris-
prudence. 
Second, this article has focused on how the EU tries to affect WTO 
dispute settlement with the aim of broadening its own scope for stringent 
SPS and TBT measures that are consistent with its WTO obligations. This 
article has not addressed the question of how the EU, internally, takes 
WTO rules and jurisprudence into account to avoid adopting WTO-in-
consistent decisions that can be challenged and sanctioned in WTO dis-
pute settlement. Future research could process-trace how EU regulation 
takes WTO rules, but especially jurisprudence, into account in deciding 
on both regulatory frameworks and concrete measures. 
43 Eg MM Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’ (2011) 
14 Journal of International Economic Law 639; T Epps, ‘Recent Developments in WTO 
Jurisprudence: Has the Appellate Body Resolved the Issue of an Appropriate Standard of 
Review in SPS Cases?’ (2012) 62 University of Toronto Law Journal 201.
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